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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate
of
JACK EDDY aka JACK P. EDDY,
aka JACK POLLARD EDDY,

Case No.

12165
Deceased.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JAMES EDDY
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a probate proceeding in which the deceased's
former wife and the former wife's daughter by a prior marriage each claim the right to distribution of the deceased's
estate pursuant to the terms of the will. Decedent's brother,
his sole heir at law, claims the estate by intestacy.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson entered a judgment,
based upon stipulated facts, in which the estate was
awarded to Sharon Hall, the daughter by a prior marriage
of the decedent's former wife.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, James Eddy, decedent's brother and sole
heir at law, seeks a reversal of the lower court judgment
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and distribution to him of the estate pursuant to the laws of
intestacy.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The determinative facts were stipulated to by counsel
and thus are not in dispute.
Decedent, Jack P. Eddy, and Roberta A. Eddy were
married in Los Angeles on November 22, 1939, and then'
were no children the issue of this marriage.
They were divorced in The Superior Court of the State
of California for the County of Los Angeles, the date of
Interlocutory Judgment of Divorce being May 31, 1967.
The divorce decree not only severed the marital bond, but
made a disposition of the property of the couple, pursuant to
stipulation of respective counsel for Mr. and Mrs. Eddy.
(R. 34-38)
Thus, Roberta Eddy got the $45,000 house in Sepulveda, California (subject to a $13,000 mortgage). The husband was ordered to quitclaim the property to Mrs. Eddy
"without delay".
Provisions were made as to what would happen in the
event of the husband's death or his failure to make support
payments or in the event of Mrs. Eddy's death.
Roberta Eddy was also awarded a $10,000 life insurance policy on her husband's life, all personal property in
her possession and the furniture and furnishings in the
Sepulveda house. Mr. Eddy was also ordered to pay
Roberta $350 per month alimony.
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The husband received a house in Salt Lake City and its
furnishings and all right to the Pension and Retirement
Fund with Monroe Auto Equipment Company, together
with title to a life insurance policy with Lumbermen's Mutual Insurance Company for an unspecified amount, and.
Roberta "expressly and specifically" waived "any and all
daim against said insurance policy, retirement plan or pension fund."
The community property, consisting of securities, was
orcle1·ed sold, proceeds to be applied first on property taxes
on the Sepuh·eda property and then to attorney's fees for
both co1111srl. (Harold Drooz, attorney for Sharon Hall in
this action, represented Roberfa Eddy in the divorce
action.)
The decree further provided:
"IT IS ADJUDGED that pursuant to stipulation
both plaintiff and defendant waive any and all right
to inherit the estate of the other at the time of his
or her death, or to take property from the other by
devise or bequest and further waive any and all
right to claim any family allowance or probate homestead or to add as personal representative upon intestacy of the other's estate or to act as personal re·presentative of the Will of the other, and both plaintiff and defendant waive any and all rights to take
by intestacy or otherwise upon the death or demisP,
of the other." (R. p. 36 emphasis added)
The husband had executed a will on January 28, 1958,
almost nine years before the Interlocutory Decree of Divorce.
Pertinent provisions of the will read:

"THIRD: I hereby give, devise and bequeath
all of my estate of every kind and character and
character and wheresoever situate, including any
property over which I may have any power of ap ..
pointment, to my said wife, ROBERTA A. EDDY.
FOURTH: In the event my said wife, ROBERTA A. EDDY, should predecease me, or we
should meet our death as a result of a common
disaster and she not survive me for a period of thirty
(30) days, the gift, bequest and devise provided for
in paragraph THIRD above shall lapse and fail and
all of my said estate shall go to my said step-daughter, SHARON HALL.''
The will also contains a provision stating that all other
heirs havP. been intentionally omitted and gives one dollar to
any person contesting the will.
The lower court, in ruling that Sharon Hall was entitled to distribution of the estate, held that Roberta Eddy
by virtue of her stipulation in the California divorce proceedings "waived and relinquished her right to inherit,"
and is "barred and estopped from asserting or receiving any
interest in decedent's estate". It further held that th9
brother, James Eddy, "has been expressly disinherited under the terms of paragraph FIFTH of decedent's will, and
that the "renunciation" of Roberta Eddy "accelerated the
interest of the alternate beneficiary, petitioner Sharon Hall,
so that the gift to Sharon Hall takes effect as if Roberta
Eddy had predeceased the testator". The court further held
that the condition precedent to the vesting of the gift to
Sharon Hall, to-wit, the death of Roberta prior to the death
of the testator, "was excused by impossibility in accordancr
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with the provisions of Section 74-2-31 U.C.A." (R. p. 5960)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
APPELLANT, ROBERTA EDDY, WAIVED AND RELINCWISHED HER RIGHT TO TAKE UNDER THE WILL OF
JACK EDDY BY REASON OF HER STIPULATION IN THE
DIVORCE DECREE.

The lower court's decision holding that Roberta Eddy
waived her right to take under the will of Jack Eddy by
reason of her stipulation in the divorce decree is in accord
with well established case law which holds that an expectancy under a will may be waived by a property settlement
whereby each spouse renounces the right to take under the
other spouse's will.
In Estate of Loeb, 280 N.Y.S. 354 (1935), the testatrix
entered into a property settlement ratified by a divorce decree. The decree provided in part:
"The husband and wife agree that each shall have
the right to dispose of his or her property by Last
Will and Testament or otherwise, and that he or she
will not claim any interest in the other party's property, except as provided in this agreement, and
each agrees that he will permit the Will of the other
to be probated and permit administration upon his
or her estate without the claim of the other party
to any right of administration ... "
The testatrix's will which included a provision for her
husband was never altered after the agreement. In a pro-

6
ceeding for construction of the will the court held:
"The separation agreement and the decree of divorc'2
which ratified it constituted a complete release of
all the husband's rights under the will of the testatrix. The agreement is clear and specific. By its
terms the husband is barred from making any claim
whatsoever to any property left by her. In Rp,
Cook's Will, 244 N.Y. 63, 164 N.E. 823, 55 A.L.R.
806; Titus 'U. Bassi, 182 App. Div. 387, 169 N.Y.S.
49; Matter of Gilmour's Estate, 146 Misc. 113, 26'J
N.Y.S. 761."
Similarly, in In Re Fratoni's Esfote, 413 Pa. 594, 198
A.2d 507 ( 1964), the husband and wife entered into a postnuptial property settlement agreement which stated:
"5. Wife hereby released and relinquishes to husband all her rights or claims of dower, inheritance,
descent and distribution, and all other claims or
rights growing out of marriage relation between
said parties, and wife shall be barred from all rights
in estate of husband, real, personal and mixed now
owned or hereafter acquired ... "
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the
agreement precluded the wife from taking under her husband's will. The court stated:
"Appellant may not contractually agree in 1949 to
a final settlement of property rights, 'both as to present and future', and by that agreement relinquish
all rights in the distribution of her husband's estate,
and then successfully claim in 1962 the entire estate
as a beneficiary under a will executed almost twenty
years prior to the agreement. To permit her to do
so, we would be required to hold that the clear, express and unmistakable language of the agreement
does not mean what it says."
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The Fratoni case did not involve a divorce and the
court made it quite clear that its decision rested upon concepts of waiver, not revocation, and, therefore, the difference, if any, between Utah and Pennsylvania statutes on
revocation of wills is not relevant to this issue. Thus, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
"It is clear that the 1949 agreement is in no sense,
a testamentary writing, codicil, or revocation of
a decedent's will. To constitute a revocation of
will there must be compliance with the Wills Act of
1947. April 24, P.L. 89, as amended, 20 P.S. 180-1180-23. This the writing fails to do. It is
clear that by the express terms of the agreement
appellant, in precise, definite, unmistakably broad
and comprehensive, legally binding language, contractually barred herself from any and all interest
in her husband's estate."

In the proceeding below, counsel for Roberta Eddy cited
several California cases where a property settlement agreement was held not to prevent a surviving spouse from taking under the will of the deceased spouse. In Re Crane's
Estate, 6 Cal. 218, 57 P.2d 476 (1936); In Re Buchman's
Estnte, 132 Cal. App. 2d 81, 281 P.2d 608 (1955); In
Rinker's Estate, 26 Cal. R. 1 (1962). A close reading of
these three California cases shows that each decision was
based on the fact that the language of the property settlement agreement in issue did not include a sufficiently
specific waiver of the right to take by bequest or devise, anfi
not because a waiver could not be effective.
In Buchman, the court stated with respect to a waiver
by the wife in a property settlement agreement:
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"But one searches in vain for any provision in \vhich
respondent agreed to forego any part of the
that might come to her by will .... "
The case of In Re Rinke1"s Estate involved the issue
of implied revocation by a divorce and also the effectiveness
of a stipulation incorporated into a judgment which settled
properly rights after a divorce. With regard to the stipulation the court stated:
"The general rule is that in order to estop appellant's
right to inherit or take under a will, the judgment
should have included a statement to the effect that
appellant waived all right and claim of inheritance
to succeed to any part of the property as an heir or
successor at law, on or event of death."
Similarly, the Crane court found the specific language
in the waiver agreement defective, stating:
"But, as if by intention, there is a total failure to set
forth in the contract any renunciation of the right
to accept and receive future gifts to one from the
other whether by way of gift inter vivos, by devise,
or by bequest. As applied to snch gift, we find in the
agreement no basis for an estoppel against appellant
with respect to the legacy claimed in the will." (Emphasis added)
The result reached by the court in each of the thret>
California cases cited above and in the other cases cited herein, which have considered the effect of a waiver of property
rights in a property settlement, post-nuptial agreement, or
divorce decree of the right to take under a will executed
prior to such agreement, has turne<l in each case on the
specific language of the agreement. The issue in each case
has been whether by the terms of the agreement, the partieq

l:I

specifically \vaived or renounced the right to take property
under the will of his or her spouse. This is the precise issue
in our case. The pertinent language in the Eddy Divorce
Decree provides:
"It is adjudged that pursuant to stipulation, both
plaintiff and defendant waive any and all right to
inherit the estate of the other at the time of his or
her death, or to take property from the other by
devise or bequest ... "

Unlike the language in the waivers considered in the
three Californian cases, the language of the waiver in the
Eddy Divorce Decree leaves no doubt that Roberta Eddy
and Jack Eddy intended to, and did waive their respective
rights to property of the other by devise or bequest. The
divorce property settlement was a careful resolution of a
negotiated parting of proprietary ways, both sides being
represented by counsel. The assets of the two people were
distributed between them. In light of the well drafted mutual absolution at the end of the meticulous division, each
party \vould surely assume as a reasonable person that at
least proprietary matters had been resolved inter se once
and for all. Surely a reasonable man could so conclude.
Why would he be concerned about a will written over eight
years before in better times, when a court decree told him
it was no longer significant?
The big issue, still unresolved by a reported decision
of a Utah court, is whether a divorce decree incorporating a
property settlement means what it says. If this court holds
that the product of Mr. Drooz and his opposing counsel's
scrivenership can be improved upon, (which this Appellant
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doubts), that it does not for some reason use with sufficient
precision the ultimate words of waiver and renunciation
'
then Utah counsel will have to add one more step to their
post-divorce therapy. They will have to advise their clients
that before their decree has the effect which it states it has,
they will have to destroy or release any prior will which they
have made.
This is not an impossible requirement, but as it would
not be the natural conclusion of a person reading a decree
such as the one before this court, it will doubtless lead to
further confusion in the years to come.
A far simpler and just decision is to hold that the decree, based upon an agreed settlement of the parties, means
what it says, and that Mrs. Eddy has no claim under this
will.
POINT II
THE DIVORCE AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT RESULTED IN A REVOCATION OF THE WILL IMPLIED BY
LAW.

Roberta Eddy has confused two quite different concepts: (1) The waiver of her right to inherit; (2) the
revocation of the will implied by law.
The factors constituting a waiver have been discussed
in Point I above.
Revocation of the will by implication of law is a separate and alternative ground for denying Roberta's claim
The lower court did not rule on the question of revocation.
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The theory of revocation of a will implied by law is
most clearly spelled out in Luff v. Luff 359 F.2d 235 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). In that case the husband had made a will in
happier wedded days, leaving all to his wife. Subsequently
there was a divorce and property settlement. The brother
sought to set the will aside, claiming intestacy. The court
agreed with the brother, and reversed the lower court.
The court in Luff stated:
"The basis for the doctrine thus approved is that
such change in the testator's condition or circumstances gives rise to a legal presumption of an intention inconsistent with a previously executed will."
The court continued:
"And the weight of decisional law is now to the effect that when a married man makes provision in
his will for his wife, and is thereafter divorced, with
a property settlement between them, such change in
the condition and circumstances of the parties impliedly revokes the previously executed will in favor
of the wife. The cases are numerous."
The court quoted a 1962 decision of the Maine Supreme
Court:
"The majority rule clearly rests on the assumption
based upon common knowledge and experience that
it is so rare and so unusual for a testator under these
circumstances [divorce and property settlement] to
desire or intend that his divorced spouse should
benefit further under his will, that it is not improper or unreasonable to require that such a testator make that extraordinary desire and intention
manifest by a formal republication of his will or by

the execution of a new will." Ca.c:;well
Me. 493, 186 A. 2d 581.

1'.

Kent, 158

There is no Utah case law on the effect of a divorce
upon a prior will. All parties apparently agree that under
the common law divorce would result in revocation implied
by law. Utah law provides:
"The common law of England, so far as it is not
repugnant to, or in conflict with the ... laws of this
state ... is hereby adopted and shall be the rule of
decision in all courts of this state" 68-3-1 U.C.A
(1953).
However, counsel for Roberta and Sharon argue that
the common law has been changed in Utah by enactment of
§74-1-24 and §74-1-25 U.C.A. (1953) which provide for
revocation of a will in the case of a subsequent marriage
with surviving wife or issue.
The issue then becomes whether the two Utah statutory
conditions for revocation by implication were intended to be
the sole and exclusive ones. There can be little doubt that
at the time of the enactment of the these two express statutory provisions ( 1898) the problem of divorce and property
settlement was a much greater rarity than it is today. It
is difficult to believe that the Utah legislature considered
the question of revocation by divorce and then chose to reject it. It is far more likely that it dealt by way of illustration only with two more common instances of change of
condition. i.e. marriage, or the birth of children.
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POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THA'l
SHARON HALL WAS ENTITLED TO THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEDENT UNDER HIS WILL.

A.

A Substitutional Beneficiary Cannot Take Under a
Will when the Conditions of His or Her taking
have not been met.

The will specifically provides that Sharon shall take
"in the event my said wife, Roberta A. Eddy, should predecease me, or we should meet our deaths as a result of a
common disaster and she not survive me for a period of 30
days ... "
This did not occur.
Appellant submits that Utah case law is controlling
here, and that In Re Beal's Estate, 117 Utah 189, 214 P.2d
525, 527-528 ( 1950) is decisive on this question.
In Beal, the will provided that "in the event my wife
and I shall perish in a common catastrophe, or disaster, then
... " the bulk of testator's 1 estate would go to the brothers
and sisters of the full blood of him and his wife.
In fact, Mr. Beal's wife predeceased him. The Utah
Supreme Court held that in such a case the provisions of
the will were inoperative, and that "the testator died intestate
to all his property with the exception of his professional library."
The named beneficiaries urged the court that the con'He gave his professional library to the University of Utah and to
Snow College.
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dition of the bequest should be .read .;;o as to add to it "or
if she predeceases him." This
the trial and supreme
court refused to do, in spite of the Utah statute, preferrillg
an interpretation of a will which vvill prevent intestacy.
In fact, the Utah court addresses itself directly to this
point, and states:
"The rule of construction that the intent of the testator must be carried out does not authorize courts
to make a new will to conform to what they think
the testator intended, but the intent of the testator
must be ascertained from the will as it stands. In
re Estate of Sowash, 62 Cal. App. 512, 516, 217 P.
123. Nor does the rule that testacy rather than intestacy is preferred relieve courts from the obligation to construe the language of the will according
to the legal effect of the words used . . . The will is
silent upon the possihility of the wife predeceasing the testator. The fact that the testator made
no provision on this subject is indicative that he
did not anticipate this contingency. What his
intent was after his wife's death we have no
means of knowing except for the fact that he allowed
the will to stand as originally executed."
The Utah court in its conclusion says:
" [ F] ailure to anticipate the contingency which did
occur, or to execute a new will after his death, cannot be cured by, in effect, writing a new will under
the guise of construing the will."
California law is in accord. In Re Kincaid's Estate,

344 P. 2d 85, 88, 89 (1959).
The facts in K1'.ncaid, a bit simplified, were that testator
left his estate in trust:
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1.

To his daughter for life;

"Should my daughter predecease me, then ... " his
grandson, Bennie, (his daughter's son) was to be able to
partake of the trust;
3. "Upon the decease of Bennie the remainder of the
estate should be distributed to the children of Bennie."
The testator's named daughter (Bennie's mother) clid
not p1·edecease the testator, although she did die during the
probate of the estate.
Bennie, understandably, petitioned for an order allowing him to partake of the Lenefits of the trust, but the California court held that Bennie was not entitled to even one
penny.
The court held that the will meant what it said, and as
Bennie's mother did not predecease her father, Bennie was to
receive nothing. The court rejected any argument of a gift
by implication.
The California court stated in concluding its reasoning:
"We are not persuaded by appellant's arguments.
The intent to make the gift which appellant claims
does not clearly appear from the trust instrument.
On the contrary, the testator set forth in his will a
clearly expressed condition precedent to the vesting
in appellant of any right to receive payments from
the trust. That condition precedent was expressed
in these words: 'Should my daughter * * * predecease me then and in such event * ':' ''''. This condition was not fulfilled, the daughter having survived the testator. Where a specific condition must
be fulfilled or performed prior to the vesting of an
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interest, the condition is a condition precedent.
Prob. Code, § 1436, cf. In re Eestate of Catlett, 117
Cal. App. 2d 315, 317-318, 255 P. 2d 464."
"We find no uncertainty or ambiguity in the quoted
language by which the testator declared the condition upon which appellant would be entitled to receive benefits from the trust. As the Supreme Court
stated in Brock v. Hall, supra, 33 Cal. 2d 885, 889,
206 P. 2d 360, 363, 11 ALR 2d 672, we " * * may
not indulge in conjecture or speculation simply because the instrument seems to have omitted something which it is reasonable to suppose should have
been provided * * * ". We are not entitled to revise
or rewrite the will on the basis of what might possibly appear to us to be a more logical testamentary
scheme. Nor would it be profitable for us to speculate as to the reasons which may have motivated the
testator in making the gift subject to the condition
which he chose to declare. The primary purpose of
all rules of construction is to ascertain the testator's
intention - " * * * not some undeclared purpose
which may be imagined to have been in his mind,
but the intention disclosed by the words he has used
* * *. In other words, the court cannot, under the
guise of construction, make a will for the testator in
place of the one he has made." In re Estate of
Spreckels, 162 Cal. 559, 567, 123 P. 371, 375; In re
Estate of Fritze, 85 Cal. App. 500, 505-506, 259 P.
992."

B.

Renunciation by the Former Wife, Robert, does
not Accelerate the Interest of the Alternate Bene·
ficiary, Sharon Hall.

A summary review of the principal of acceleration in
the possession of an estate clearly shows that it is not ap-
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plicable to the facts in this case. Acceleration is a hastening
of the enjoyment of an estate which was otherwise postponed to a later date. Auerbach v. Samuels, 9 Utah 2d 879,
342 P .2d 879 ( 1959). It is generally applied to hasten possession of a remainder estate when the preceding life estate terminates prior to death. Sharon Hall's interest in the estate
of decedent is not that of a remainderman who will eventually possess the estate anyway, but is that of a substitutiun:1l beneficiary whose right to take was subject to an absolute condition that was not fulfilled. Thus this case involves not an issue of whether a remainder should be accelerated but rather a problem of whether renunciation of
an interest is equivalent to death. On this point the law is
clear.
"Renunciation on the part of the original beneficiary
was not equivalent to his death ... and so the alternative beneficiary was not entitled to take as substituted legatee or devisee." 157 A.L.R. 1104.
In Broaddus v. Park College, 180 S.W. 2d 268 (Mo.
1944) cited in the above annotation testator gave $5,000.00
to his wife with a provision in his will that if she predeceased him the $5,000.00 should go to two of his nieces. The
bulk of the estate was to go into a trust which would provide
the income for life to his wife with the remainder to twentythree named beneficiaries. The will also provided in paragraph 15 that if the wife 1·efused to take under the will
1hen the property should be distributed to the other benef iciarie:; in the same manner, "If my said wife were not
liYing-," The wife outlived the testator aY'.d renounced her
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interest undel· the will. ln ;m actio1, for consb'uction of the
will, the court held that the nieces were not entitled to the
$5,000.00 :ls the wife did not predecease the testator and
that the term ''If my wife \Vere not living" in paragraph
15 of the will referred to the time she renounced and not to
the time of testator's death; and, therefore, the nieces were
also not entitled to a share as beneficiaries under paragraph
15 of the will. The court staterl:
"When the wife outlived the testator, the event
which would entitle respondents to the $5,000.00
item did not materialize and therefore, at his death,
the effective date of the will left them without any
interest in said item . . . It is clear from the will
that the testator did not intend for the respondents
to be beneficiaries if the wife outlived him and did
not renounce the will ... We are of the opinion that
respondents do not come within the term beneficiaries as used in this will; because whatever contingent right they may have had in this $5,000.00,
ceased to exist when the wife outlived the husband."
157 A.L.R. 1105-1106
In In Re Lampshire, 57 :Misc. 2d 332, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 578
decedent's will left everything to his wife and then provided
that:
"In the event my wife should predecease me or we
should die under the circumstances whereby the
survivor cannot be determined as between us, then
and in that event ... "
the property was to go to certain named children. The court
held that a subsequent divorce revoked the wife's interest
in the will pursuant to the provisions of a New York statute.
The gift over to the children was also held to have failed

19
as the former wife did not in fact predecease the decedent.
The court stated:
"The expressed contingency not having occurred, the
result is intestacy ... The dispositive provisions of
the will are limited by certain provisions which,
having not occurred caused the result to be intestacy."
The court based its decision on the rule that:
" 'The court should not make a new will based on
speculation as to what the testator might have intended.'

' * * * The fact that an event happend prior or subsequent to the making of the will, which, as the will
may indicate or disclose, was unknown or unforeseen and unprovided against by the testatrix, cannot
affect the meaning of the language used.' " ( Citations omitted)
C.

The Will itself shows that Testator was aware of
how to Provide for this Contingency, and yet did
not do it.

Appellant calls the court's attention to paragraph
SIXTH of the will, wherein testator after first appointing
his then wife as executrix, goes on to say:
"In the event my said wife shall predecease me or
for any reason be unable or unwilling to act as executrix hereof, I appoint my stepdaughter, Sharon
Hall ... "
Appellant concedes that if the testator had used the
wording outlined above in the bequest clause providing for
Sharon there would be little that he could urge here. But
this is precisely the point at issue.
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Testator did not use such wording. To allow Sharon
to recover would require that this will be rewritten to
include exactly such wording in the bequest to Sharon.
Unfortunately for her it was not, and as innumerable
cases have held, it is not the court's function to rewrite
a will. But the very inclusion of this phrase in one portion
of the will, and its exclusion in another, where the same sequence of beneficiaries is utilized, by the concept of expressio unio, exclusio alterius, is but one more reason why
Sharon's claim should fail.
POINT IV
THE CONDITION PRECEDENT TO SHARON HALL'S
TAKING WAS NOT EXCUSED BY IMPOSSIBILITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 24-2-31, UCA. 1953.

The lower court held that because Roberta Eddy did
not predecease decedent the condition of Sharon Hall's taking was excused because of impossibility in accordance with
Section 74-2-31, U.C.A. 1953. 2
Such a result is clearly not intended by this statute, for
if it were, then any condition that did not occur would be
excused as "impossible" because it did not occur. ·Thus, for
example, in our case assuming that Roberta Eddy and decedent had not been divorced, Sharon Hall would still be
entitled to the estate of decedent and not Roberta Eddy be274-2-31. When disposition vests. "Where a testamentary disposition
is made upon a condition precedent, nothing vests until the condition
is fulfilled, except where such fulfillment is impossible, in which rase
the disposition vests, unless the condition was the sole motive thereof,
and the impossibility was unknown to the testator, or arose from an
unavoidable event subsequent to the execution of the will.
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cause the condition of Roberta Eddy predeceasing decedent
would have been excused by impossibility. In fact, the
standard "To Z in the event X predeceases Y," which is
often used in wills, would always be an absolute gift because
when the condition did not occur it would be excused as
"impossible." We would submit that the only reasonable
construction of this statute is not that fulfillment of a condition is excused if the condition itself did not occur but that
the statute is referring to a condition that could not be
performed. In any event, the statute is not applicable by its
own terms as the death of Roberta Eddy was clearly "the
sole motive" for the gift to Sharon Hall, as such term is
used in the statute.
POINT V
JAMES EDDY HAS NOT BEEN DISINHERITED UNDER THE INST ANT FACTS.

Paragraph Fifth of the will provides:
"FIFTH: I have, except as otherwise provided
in this Will, intentionally and with full knowledge,
omitted to provide for my heirs who may be living
at the time of my death, including any person or
persons who may, after the date of this will, become
my heir or heirs by reason of marriage or otherwise.
If any person, whether a beneficiary under this will
or not mentioned herein, shall contest this will or
object to any of the provisions hereof, I hereby give
to such person so contesting or objecting the sum of
One Dollar ($1.00) and no more, in lieu of the provision which I have or which I might have made
herein for such person so contesting or objecting."
As to the in terrorem $1.00 clause, it is clearly not applicable by its very terms applied to these facts.
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In the instant proceedings, Jack Eddy does not "con.
test this will or object to any other provisions (t) hereof".
To the contrary, he admits that the will of decedent was
properly executed and he makes no objections to any of the
provisions contained therein.
It is simply his contention that the provisions of the

will do not apply to these facts, and it is, therefore, not
operative. The will applied only to certain situations which
did not materialize, and while perfectly valid in those certain situations, it does not dispose of the estate in the event,
as in the case before us, of a subsequent divorce, property
settlement and waiver by the former wife who also survived
the decedent.
Thus, courts have construed "contest" within the con·
templation of a forfeiture provision in a will disinheriting
a person who "contests" it to mean any legal proceeding
which is designed to thwart the testator's wishes as stated
in his will. In Re Holtermann's Estate, (1962) 206 CA. 2d
460, 23 Cal. R. 685. Such conduct is illustrated by a contest of a will on the ground of improper execution, undue
influence, or lack of testamentary capacity. In Re Holter·
mann's Estate, supra. But, of course, James Eddy makes
no such allegations in this case.
This should be contrasted with an action to determine
the true construction and applicability of a will, where a
no contest clause is held not to apply. In Re Zappettini's
Estate, (1963) 223 CA. 2d 424, 36 Cal. R. 844.
Moreover, the intention to exclude the decedant's heirs
is only expressed on the assumption that the will validly
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disposes of the estate to other persons. Assuming, as this
appellant contends, that in light of the facts at the time of
death there is no valid disposition to either of the two designated other persons, then the will is silent as to the testator's intention. We are not permitted to guess as to this and
in effect rewrite the will. The laws of intestate succession
are devised to meet and resolve this very problem. A decedent's estate must go somewhere. Failing disposition by will,
it goes by the laws of intestacy. The only other possibility
might be an escheat to the state, but under no rational basis can paragraph FIFTH be construed to show decedent's
intent to have this occur.
Paragraph FIFTH simply means that if the estate goes
to either Roberta Eddy or to Sharon Hall, then no provision
is made for any heirs, and if they attempt to contest the
will, they will be penalized. It is silent as to the conquences if either of the specified beneficiaries cannot take.
CONCLUSION
Appellant, James Eddy, would concede that testator's
intention as shown by his will is clearly set forth in the
event he stayed married to Roberta Eddy or in event Roberta Eddy predeceased him. However, neither of these
events occurred and it is impossible to know what testator
would have done under these facts. As this court has consistantly held, it is not proper for courts to rewrite a will
to conform with what they think a testator intended. The
intent of a testator must be gathered from the four corners
of the will, and in this case, the will in clear and simp!i>.
language is silent and nondistributive as to the actual event-

ualities which have occurred. In such case, the law provides
that distribution should be made pursuant to the laws of intestacy which appellant, James Eddy, urges the court to so
hold in this case.
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